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Audit fee discounting in the
post-SOX environment
Benjamin W. Hoffman
Department of Accounting, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio, USA, and

Albert L. Nagy
Department of Accountancy, John Carroll University, University Heights,
Ohio, USA

Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to investigate whether the expected implementation of Section 404(b) of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 404(b)) (the integrated audit requirement) caused auditors to discount their audit
fees for non-accelerated ﬁlers in anticipation of expected increased future economic rents (DeAngelo, 1981)
from those clients.
Design/methodology/approach – This paper predicts that auditors charged their non-accelerated
ﬁler clients lower audit fees during the years 2005-2007 (in anticipation of increased expected future
economic rents from the implementation of the SOX 404(b) requirement) compared with the years 20102012 (when it had been determined that non-accelerated ﬁlers were permanently exempt from
complying with SOX 404(b)). The authors use ordinary least squares regression analysis to examine
whether audit fees increased signiﬁcantly for non-accelerated ﬁlers after the permanent exemption
announcement.
Findings – The results show a signiﬁcant positive association between the exemption announcement and
audit fees, supporting the theory that auditors discounted their audit fees for non-accelerated ﬁlers in the preexemption announcement period. This ﬁnding is robust when sensitivity tests are used.
Practical implications – The ﬁndings of audit fee discounting literature related to the post-SOX period
are mixed. This study adds to this stream of literature by supporting the notion that audit fee discounting is
being practiced post-SOX and is a potential unintended consequence of SOX 404 and the exemption. Thus,
investors will be interested in the results of this paper when making their investment decisions with regard to
non-accelerated ﬁlers.
Social implications – The results of this paper show that, even in the post-SOX environment, auditors
will employ the use of audit fee discounting if a change in regulation incentivizes it. This commentary on the
present state of the audit pricing market should be of interest to audit pricing policymakers.
Originality/value – This paper is one of the ﬁrst to study audit fee discounting outside the realm of initial
audit engagements.

Keywords Audit fees, Audit pricing, Internal control, SOX 404, Audit fee discounting
Paper type Research paper

Introduction
The practice of audit fee discounting has been a concern of regulators for the past four
decades (AICPA, 1978; PCAOB, 2011). There are two primary concerns regarding
auditors engaging in this practice. First, regulators are concerned that audit fee
discounting impairs an auditor’s independence. If auditors are discounting their fees to
obtain or retain a client, they will be motivated to keep that client long enough to recoup
the losses incurred from the discounted fees. This motivation could impair the auditors’
independence, as they may be more willing to give in to management pressures if the
auditors are concerned about losing the client (PCAOB, 2011). Second, regulators are
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concerned that audit fee discounting will decrease audit quality. When charging lower
audit fees than they should, auditors may be motivated to “cut corners” during their
completion of the audit to incur smaller losses. Several State Boards of Accountancy
have shown evidence of this occurring (Hansen, 2010).
Prior literature has studied this phenomenon to:
 determine whether audit fee discounting is occurring in practice; and
 allay or conﬁrm these regulator concerns.
DeAngelo (1981) theorized that auditors engage in this practice to earn future economic
rents. Starting with Simon and Francis (1988), several studies have found (empirically) the
existence of initial audit fee discounting (Kanodia and Mukherji, 1994; Stanley and DeZoort,
2007). This prior research focuses on whether audit ﬁrms engage in initial audit fee
discounting, i.e. lowballing, to obtain clients with the expectation of recouping the discounts
from future engagements. A related question that has not been addressed by the research is
whether audit ﬁrms engage in audit fee discounting of existing clients whose audit fees are
expected to increase signiﬁcantly for future engagements. Our study addresses this question
by examining audit fee discounting in a unique setting: the planned implementation, delay
and ultimate exemption of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act: Section 404(b) (SOX 404(b)) integrated
audit requirement for nonaccelerated ﬁlers (“the exemption”). Analyzing audit fee pricing in
this setting allows us to consider the possibility of the practice of audit fee discounting
outside the realm of initial audit pricing. In other words, we are able to ask the question:
Does an expected future regulatory change (one that will increase future economic rents)
motivate auditors to discount their present audit fees?
We select a sample of non-accelerated ﬁlers during the pre-(2005-2007) and post-(20102012) SOX 404(b) exemption periods to estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
that measures the exemption effect on audit fees. The results show that audit fees for nonaccelerated ﬁlers are signiﬁcantly lower during the pre-SOX 404(b) exemption period than
during the post-SOX 404(b) exemption period.
Our study contributes to accounting literature in several ways. First and foremost: to our
knowledge, this is one of the few studies that addresses audit fee discounting outside of the
realm of initial audit fee discounting. Our unique setting of the implementation of SOX 404(b)
and the subsequent exemption for non-accelerated ﬁlers allows us to do so. Thus, we identify
audit fee discounting across both new and continuing non-accelerated audit clients. This
ﬁnding should be of interest to regulators, investors, audit committee members and academics
that are concerned about the potential consequences of audit fee discounting. Also, the ﬁndings
of audit fee discounting literature related to the post-SOX period are mixed: some studies ﬁnd
evidence of a decrease or elimination of audit fee discounting post-SOX (Ghosh and Pawlewicz,
2009; Huang et al., 2009), while others ﬁnd the continued use of audit fee discounting post-SOX
(Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006; Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant, 2009; Sankaraguruswamy
et al., 2012; Desir et al., 2014; Ettredge et al., 2014; Krishnan and Zhang, 2014). Our study adds
to this stream of literature by supporting the notion that audit fee discounting is being
practiced post-SOX and is a potential unintended consequence of SOX 404 and the
exemption. Finally, we contribute to the audit pricing literature by showing that, even
in the post-SOX environment, auditors will employ the use of audit fee discounting if a
change in regulation allows the expected future economic rents to outweigh the initial
costs of doing so. This commentary of the present state of the audit pricing market
should be of interest to regulators, investors, audit committee members and academics
as the market continues to evolve.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses prior
research related to this topic as well as the motivation and logic supporting our hypothesis.
The following section describes the sample, research method and variable deﬁnitions. Next,
we discuss and analyze the results of our models. Finally, we summarize the study and
identify any limitations.
Background, prior research and hypothesis development
Background and prior research
Audit fee discounting. Several prior studies have theorized about and examined data related
to the concept of the discounting of audit pricing. DeAngelo (1981) was the ﬁrst research
paper to address this topic: she theorized that auditors discount initial audit engagements
(termed “low-balling”) due to the anticipation of increased future economic rents. Incumbent
auditors were expected to earn higher proﬁts in subsequent audits due to start-up costs to
the auditor in the ﬁrst year as well as the hesitation of clients to switch auditors after that
ﬁrst year due to signiﬁcant switching costs. Simon and Francis (1988) studied this
empirically, ﬁnding a signiﬁcant audit fee reduction for initial audit engagements, with fees
increasing to normal levels by the fourth year of the audit. Several subsequent studies also
found evidence of initial audit fee discounting in various settings and periods (Ettredge and
Greenberg, 1990; Craswell and Francis, 1999; Walker and Casterella, 2000; Ghosh and
Lustgarten, 2006; Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant, 2009; Ghosh and Pawlewicz, 2009;
Sankaraguruswamy et al., 2012; Desir et al., 2014).
The focus of this stream of prior literature is on initial audit fee discounting; our setting
gives us the ability to examine audit fee discounting for both new and continuing audit
clients in an environment where fees are expected to signiﬁcantly increase for a group of
clients due to a change in regulation. This practice of audit fee discounting naturally raises
concerns about possible negative effects. There are two primary concerns about potential
adverse effects of initial audit fee discounting. The ﬁrst concern is in relation to
compromised auditor independence. Some regulators worried that the performance of audit
services below cost with the intention of recovering those losses in future years would
impair the auditor’s independence due to their implicit commitment to the client due to this
long-term plan (AICPA, 1978). Simon and Francis (1988) found support for this in their
study when considering the psychological theory of sunk costs. They found that
inconsistent with the sunk cost theory, taking an initial loss does signiﬁcantly affect
subsequent decision-making. Thus, in the context of auditing, audit fee discounting commits
the auditor to the client until that initial loss is recovered. More recently, there has been
empirical research to support the notion that initial audit fee discounting impairs the
auditor’s independence (Stanley and DeZoort, 2007). Speciﬁcally, Stanley and DeZoort (2007)
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative relation between audit fees and restatements and conclude that
this is consistent with concerns that lowball audit pricing strategies jeopardize auditor
independence. Another potential adverse by-product of initial audit fee discounting is
increased susceptibility to management pressures if the auditor is concerned about
maintaining a long-term relationship with management to recover initial losses.
The second primary concern about initial audit fee discounting is deterioration of audit
quality for those ﬁrms that participate in the practice of this discounting. This concern was
initially addressed in prior theoretical research (Kanodia and Mukherji, 1994), stating that
initial audit fee discounting erodes audit quality. More recently, regulators have stated this
concern consistently. For example, the PCAOB suggested the following in a concept release:
Or, if as some have suggested auditors bid on new engagements with the assumption that they
will lose money in the ﬁrst years of an engagement but recoup that loss over a long period of time,
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the problem may be unrealistic pricing, with a resulting eﬀect on audit eﬀort or resources at the
beginning of an auditor-client relationship (PCAOB, 2011).
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In addition, the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy (NASBA) issued a
discussion paper on this topic, stating that State Boards of Accountancy have recently
identiﬁed instances of unacceptable audit practices related to underpriced audits (Hansen,
2010). More speciﬁcally, audit ﬁrms in these situations are failing to investigate material
misstatements in ﬁnancial statements.
These perceptions of audit fee discounting provide motivation to identify speciﬁc
settings in which audit fee discounting is encouraged by that setting. Speciﬁcally, audit fee
discounting may potentially occur in situations that the audit ﬁrm expects more work in the
future, and in turn, more revenue from the client. For example, audit fee discounting may
occur for clients whom the auditor anticipates increased rents from expected merger and
acquisition activity, global growth and secondary offerings. The implementation of SOX 404(b)
internal control audits and the subsequent exemption of non-accelerated ﬁlers from having to
complete those audits provides us with just such a unique setting.
Sarbanes–Oxley Act 404(b) and the exemption. SOX 404(b) created the requirement that
public companies be subject to an integrated audit, which includes two audit opinions: one
opinion on whether the ﬁnancial statements are free of material misstatement, and one
opinion on whether the company’s internal controls over ﬁnancial reporting are free of
material weaknesses. This requirement caused much controversy in the business
community primarily due to signiﬁcant compliance costs, particularly for smaller public
companies (Krishnan et al., 2008). Due to this burden on smaller public companies, the
deadline for non-accelerated ﬁlers to comply with SOX 404(b) was continually delayed[1].
Ultimately, these companies are indeﬁnitely exempt from having to comply with this
requirement. This was established by the Dodd–Frank Consumer Protection Act in July
2010 (H.R. 4173, 2010).
Despite the continued delays of SOX 404(b) compliance for non-accelerated ﬁlers, there
was little if any anticipation of the exemption by auditors and their clients. In October 2009,
the ﬁrst evidence of a possible permanent exemption was mentioned in the business press:
on October 8, 2009, the Small Business SOX Compliance Relief Act was introduced to
Congress by Representative Scott Garrett (H.R. 3775, 2009), which proposed the permanent
exemption. Based on a comprehensive search, there was no mention of the possibility of a
permanent exemption prior to this date[2]. This fact allows us to consider the possibility that
auditors offered discounted audit pricing to their non-accelerated clients in anticipation of
the signiﬁcant additional fees they would earn when SOX 404(b) compliance was required.
Auditors could accurately anticipate the future additional SOX 404(b) fees due to the work
already being performed for their accelerated-ﬁler clients. Prior research documents
signiﬁcant audit fee increases (i.e. from 86 to 359 per cent) for accelerated ﬁlers from the preto post-SOX 404(b) requirement periods (Raghunandan and Rama, 2006; Krishnan et al.,
2008).
Hypothesis development
Prior audit fee discounting research examines initial audit fee discounting by isolating fees
in the ﬁrst year of an audit and comparing those fees to subsequent years’ fees through
regression analysis. As described above, we examine audit fee discounting for existing
clients under the unique environment created by SOX 404(b) and its subsequent exemption
for nonaccelerated ﬁlers. There is a three-year period (2005-2007) where auditors are
anticipating future economic rents to occur for non-accelerated ﬁlers when integrated audits
become required for those companies. Based on the theory proposed by DeAngelo (1981),

there is clear incentive for auditors to entice or retain non-accelerated clients with lower fees
to earn substantial future economic rents with the performance of the integrated audit in the
future.
We expand DeAngelo’s (1981) theory to beyond that of the initial audit engagement by
suggesting that subsequent audit fee negotiations involve auditors weighing engagement
risks and costs versus the expected future quasi rents. Consistent with DeAngelo’s (1981)
theory, we propose that the expected future quasi rents and current period audit fees are
inversely related, ceteris paribus. The regulatory shock of the permanent SOX 404(b)
exemption caused a signiﬁcant reduction in the expected future quasi rents of nonaccelerated ﬁler clients and, in turn, increased the current audit fees of these clients. This
leads to the following hypothesis:
H1. Non-accelerated ﬁlers had higher audit fees after the SOX 404(b) permanent
exemption than before the exemption.
Research design
Sample
Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006) ﬁnd that audit fee discounting and competition is greater
among small audit ﬁrms than it is among large audit ﬁrms. They show that about 9 per cent
of the largest audit ﬁrms’ clients are new clients as compared to that of about 34 per cent for
smaller audit ﬁrms’ clients. The non-accelerated ﬁlers’ market primarily consists of smaller
audit ﬁrms and provides a ripe setting to examine the potential practice of audit fee
discounting.
The sample for this study consists of non-accelerated ﬁlers covering a pre- and postexemption period, for the years 2005 to 2007 and 2010 to 2012, respectively. This study
attempts to capture auditor reactions to the lost future economic rents due to the exemption.
The pre- and post-exemption period cut-off should be the time when auditors anticipated the
exemption and in turn the lost future rents. To select the appropriate cutoff date, we
researched the dates of the key events leading up to the implementation of the exemption by
the Dodd–Frank Consumer Protection Act in July 2010. Initially, the effective date of SOX
404(b) compliance for nonaccelerated ﬁlers was ﬁscal year-ends beginning with December
15, 2007. However, this deadline was extended three times: to December 15, 2008, December
15, 2009, and ﬁnally June 15, 2010; this ﬁnal extension was announced on October 2, 2009
(Aguilar, 2009a). Also in October 2009, the ﬁrst evidence of a possible permanent exemption
was mentioned in the business press: on October 8, 2009, the Small Business SOX
Compliance Relief Act was introduced to Congress by Representative Scott Garrett (H.R.
3775, 2009). This bill proposed the permanent exemption of non-accelerated ﬁlers from
compliance with SOX 404(b). This bill became part of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, which was passed by Congress on December 11, 2009 (Aguilar, 2009b).
Ultimately, this bill became the Dodd–Frank Consumer Protection Act, which became
effective in July 2010.
Based on this timeline, we conclude that by 2008, auditors began considering the
possibility of the exemption, and by the end of 2009, they anticipated the exemption as a
(most likely) permanent exemption. We separate the pre- and post-exempt periods by
eliminating 2008 and 2009, the two-year period when the likelihood of the exemption or the
SOX 404(b) requirement for non-accelerated ﬁlers was in a state of uncertainty. The pre- and
post-exemption sample periods, 2005 to 2007 and 2010 to 2012, respectively, allows for the
comparison of audit pricing between periods in which auditors had different expectations
regarding future SOX 404(b) audit work.
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We establish the start of the pre-exemption period as 2005 for two reasons. First, prior to
2005, SOX and the PCAOB’s related auditing standard (Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS 2))
were in the process of being implemented, and AS 2 became effective for accelerated ﬁlers
with ﬁscal year-ends of November 15, 2004 or later (PCAOB, 2004). Thus, auditor
expectations regarding these new regulations were uncertain between 2002 and 2004.
Second, by 2005, auditor expectations became clear: non-accelerated ﬁlers will need to
comply with SOX 404(b) imminently. This also allows us to have a consistent length (three
years) for the pre- and post-exemption periods.
Our initial sample includes all non-accelerated ﬁler companies for the pre- and postexemption periods (2005-2007 and 2010-2012) that had audit fees per the Audit Analytics
data base and the same ﬁler status from the pre- to post-periods. The market capitalization
(share price  common stock outstanding) determined the ﬁling status of the sampled
companies. That is, the observations with less than US$75m of market capitalization are
classiﬁed as nonaccelerated ﬁlers for this study[3]. Table I presents a description of the
sample. The initial sample included 7,758 ﬁrm-year observations. Given the fundamentally
different operating characteristics associated with ﬁnancial institutions, we exclude
observations with an SIC Code in the 6000s (1,701 observations). A total of 1,073
observations were omitted because they did not have the sufﬁcient control variables’ data
from Research Insight. This leaves a ﬁnal sample of 4,984 ﬁrm-year observations, which
consists of 2,302 in the pre-exemption period and 2,682 in the post-exemption period.
Models
We rely on prior audit fee research (Francis et al., 2005; Nagy, 2014) in determining an
appropriate OLS regression model to test the SOX 404(b) exemption effect on audit fees (H1).
The OLS regression model is speciﬁed as follows:
LAF ¼ a þ b 1 EXEMPT þ b 2 SIZE þ b 3 SEG þ b 4 CATA þ b 5 QUICK þ b 6 LEV
þ b 7 ROA þ b 8 GC þ b 9 BUSY þ b 10 LOSS þ b 11-59 IND
where:
LAF
= natural log of audit fees in dollars;
EXEMPT = 1 if post-SOX 404(b) exemption period (2010-2012), 0 for pre-SOX 404(b) exemption
period (2005-2007);
SIZE
= natural log of total assets;
SEG
= natural log of the number of reported business segments;
CATA
= ratio of current assets to total assets;
QUICK = ratio of current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities;
LEV
= ratio of debt to total assets;

Initial samplea
Financial institution (SIC in 6000s)
Missing control variables data per Research Insight
Final sample

Table I.
Sample description

7,758
(1,701)
(1,073)
4,984

Notes: aThe initial sample includes all non-accelerated ﬁler ﬁrm-year observations from the Audit
Analytics data base for the years 2005 to 2007 and 2010 to 2012, with audit fees data and did not change ﬁler
status from the pre- to post-exemption periods

ROA
GC
BUSY
LOSS
IND

= return on assets for the year;
= 1 if audit report is modiﬁed for going-concern, 0 otherwise;
= 1 if the ﬁscal year end is in December, January, February or March, 0 otherwise;
= 1 if net income is negative, 0 otherwise; and
= dummy variables based on two-digit SIC codes (49 industries).

A signiﬁcant and positive coefﬁcient on the EXEMPT variable would support H1 and
suggest that non-accelerated ﬁlers experienced discounted audit fees in the pre-exemption
period. The control variables were derived from prior audit fee research and control for
cross-sectional differences in factors that affect audit fees such as client size, audit
complexity and audit risk (Simunic, 1980; Craswell et al., 1995; Frankel et al., 2002; Ferguson
et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005). Speciﬁcally, higher fees are expected (positive coefﬁcients)
for larger clients (SIZE), for those with greater audit complexity, risk and effort (SEG,
CATA, LEV, LOSS and GC), and for busy season clients (BUSY). Lower audit fees are
expected (negative coefﬁcients) for more liquid and proﬁtable clients (QUICK and ROA).
Finally, the dummy variables IND control for any industry ﬁxed effects.
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Results
Main results
Table II presents pre- and post-exemption descriptive statistics for the study’s variables of
interest. The mean of the LAF variable signiﬁcantly increases from the pre- to post-exempt
periods (p < 0.01). This result suggests that non-accelerated ﬁlers had higher audit fees after
the exemption, and supports H1[4].
The univariate comparisons further indicate that the sample observations, on average,
increased in size (SIZE), number of business segments (SEG) and issuance rates of going
concern reports (GC) from the pre- to post-exempt period. The pre- to post-exempt changes
for the remaining variables are not signiﬁcant at any conventional level.
Variablea

Total (n = 4,984)

Pre-exempt (n = 2,302)

Post-exempt (n = 2,682)

Differenceb (Post-Pre)

LAF
SIZE
SEG
CATA
QUICK
LEV
ROA
GC
BUSY
LOSS

12.076 (11.932)
3.372 (3.088)
0.206 (0.000)
2.778 (1.443)
2.229 (1.048)
1.594 (0.232)
64.483 (1.943)
0.230 (0.000)
0.653 (1.000)
0.535 (1.000)

12.007 (11.876)
3.283 (3.018)
0.150 (0.000)
2.708 (1.505)
2.149 (1.093
1.908 (0.210)
60.482 (1.056)
0.213 (0.000)
0.655 (1.000)
0.525 (1.000)

12.135 (11.970)
3.448 (3.147)
0.254 (0.000)
2.839 (1.399)
2.297 (1.012)
1.324 (0.247)
67.918 (2.708)
0.245 (0.000)
0.651 (1.000)
0.544 (1.000)

0.128***
0.165**
0.104***
0.131
0.148
0.584
7.436
0.032***
0.004
0.019

Notes: ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively (one-tailed tests where
relation is predicted); aVariable deﬁnitions: LAF = natural log of audit fees in dollars, SIZE = the natural
log of total assets, SEG = natural log of the number of reported business segments, CATA = ratio of current
assets to total assets, QUICK = ratio of current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities, LEV = ratio of
debt to total assets, ROA = return on assets for the year, GC = 1 if audit report is modiﬁed for going
concern, 0 otherwise, BUSY = 1 if the ﬁscal year end is December through March, 0 otherwise, LOSS = 1 if
net income is negative, 0 otherwise; btests for differences in the means are based on t-statistics (z-statistics)
for continuous variables (proportions); Nonparametric tests for differences in location are based on the
Wilcoxon rank sum test

Table II.
Descriptive statistics
mean (median)
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The correlations among the variables are presented in Table III. The signiﬁcant and positive
correlation between LAF and EXEMPT suggest audit fees were higher in the postexemption period and supports our hypothesis. The general correlations between LAF and
the remaining independent variables suggest that larger, more complex, ﬁnancially healthy
companies tend to have higher audit fees. Furthermore, audit fees tend to be higher (lower)
for companies audited during the busy season (receiving a going concern opinion). As
expected, the control variables that tend to increase with company size (SIZE, SEG) are
positively (negatively) correlated with ﬁnancial health (distress) (ROA, LOSS). The
remaining correlations are generally consistent with expectations.
Table IV presents the results of the OLS regression model used to test the exemption
effect on audit fees. The model is highly signiﬁcant (p < 0.01) and the adjusted R2 is 76.57
per cent. The positive and signiﬁcant EXEMPT variable suggests that audit fees increased
from the pre- to the post-exempt period for non-accelerated ﬁlers. The EXEMPT coefﬁcient
reﬂects a 4.7 per cent increase in audit fees from the pre- to post-exempt periods[5]. This
result supports H1. The control variables SIZE, SEG, LEV, ROA, GC, BUSY and LOSS are
signiﬁcant and in the predicted direction, and suggest that audit fees increase for larger
companies that exhibit higher audit risk, complexity and effort. The remaining control
variables are not signiﬁcant.
Additional analyses
We perform four additional analyses to test the robustness of the reported result. First, we reestimate the regression model only using companies that retained the same audit ﬁrm
throughout the study period. Second, as a frame of reference or benchmark, we examine the
audit fee changes for accelerated ﬁlers from the pre- to post-exemption periods and compare
their change to that of non-accelerated ﬁlers. Third, the audit fee discounting of initial audit
engagements is measured separately in the regression model. Fourth, we consider and control
for a possible auditor size effect on the reported result in the regression. Finally, we analyze
audit fee levels during a third sample period prior to our pre-exemption period: 2002-2004 and
compare audit fees during that period to audit fees in the pre- and post-exemption periods.
For the ﬁrst additional analysis, the regression model was estimated using only
companies that had the same auditor throughout the six-year test period (2005-2007 and
2010-2012). By including only same-auditor companies in the sample, we control for any
potential auditor change effects on audit fees. This analysis also mitigates the possibility of
any unforeseen unique pre- and post-exemption subsample effects because the same
companies are included in each subsample.
Table V presents the results of the OLS regression model estimated using companies
with the same auditor throughout the sample period (n = 1,215). The model is highly
signiﬁcant (p < 0.01) and the adjusted R2 is 86.73 per cent. Consistent with the Table III
results, the EXEMPT variable is positive and signiﬁcant, and is evidence that audit fees
increased from the pre- to the post-exempt period for non-accelerated ﬁlers that had the
same auditor throughout the period. This result suggests that the increase in audit fees from
the pre- to post-period is not driven by any auditor change effects, or by any unforeseen
unique subsample effect, and further supports our hypothesis.
For the second additional analysis, we establish a frame of reference or a benchmark by
estimating the regression model using both accelerated and non-accelerated ﬁler companies.
The accelerated ﬁlers are included in the sample to determine if the reported audit fee
increase of non-accelerated ﬁlers is the result of a trend in the audit pricing market. To
provide a more meaningful comparison between accelerated and non-accelerated ﬁlers, we
only include accelerated ﬁlers with a market capitalization below US$150m[6]. This allows

SIZE

0.84***
0.05***

EXEMPT

0.08***

0.20***
0.19***
0.20***

SEG

QUICK
0.07***
0.05***
0.03**
0.02
0.99***

CATA
0.08***
0.05***
0.03**
0.01

0.09***
0.02
0.17***
0.03**
0.02
0.01

LEV
0.09***
0.03**
0.16***
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.01

ROA
0.35***
0.01
0.55***
0.11***
0.46***
0.45***
0.31***
0.54***

GC

LOSS
0.23***
0.06***
0.40***
0.09***
0.18***
0.16***
0.15***
0.72***
0.39***
0.05***

BUSY
0.17***
0.03**
0.12***
0.02*
0.12***
0.09***
0.07***
0.02
0.05***

Notes: *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed tests; awe report Spearman-rank correlation
coefﬁcients for discrete variables (EXEMPT, GC, BUSY, LOSS) and Pearson correlations otherwise; bvariable deﬁnitions: See Table II for variable deﬁnitions

LAF
EXEMPT
SIZE
SEG
CATA
QUICK
LEV
ROA
GC
BUSY

Variable
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Table III.
Correlations among
variablesa,b

LAF ¼ a þ b 1 EXEMPT þ b 2 SIZE þ b 3 SEG þ b 4 CATA þ b 5 QUICK þ b 6 LEV
þ b 7 ROA þ b 8 GC þ b 9 BUSY þ b 10 LOSS þ b 11-59 IND
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Table IV.
Audit fee model
using full sample

Variablea

Prediction

Estimated coefficients

t-statistic

Intercept
EXEMPT
SIZE
SEG
CATA
QUICK
LEV
ROA
GC
BUSY
LOSS
Number of observations
Adjusted R2
F-ratio

None
þ
þ
þ
þ

þ

þ
þ
þ
4,984
76.57%
277.07***

10.434
0.046
0.452
0.038
0.046
0.043
0.004
0.001
0.177
0.072
0.264

133.70***
2.58***
93.18***
1.84**
5.43***
5.00***
8.07***
5.68***
6.52***
3.66***
12.86***

Notes: ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively (based on one-tailed tests
where relation is predicted); aIndustry dummy variables have been suppressed for expositional
convenience; Variable deﬁnitions: LAF = natural log of audit fees in dollars, EXEMPT = 1 if post-SOX 404
(b) exempt period (2010-2012), 0 if pre-SOX 404(b) exempt period (2005-2007), SIZE = the natural log of total
assets, SEG = natural log of the number of reported business segments, CATA = ratio of current assets to
total assets, QUICK = ratio of current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities, LEV = ratio of debt to
total assets, ROA = return on assets for the year, GC = 1 if audit report is modiﬁed for going concern, 0
otherwise, BUSY = 1 if the ﬁscal year end is December thru March, 0 otherwise, LOSS = 1 if net income is
negative, 0 otherwise, IND = dummy variables based on two-digit SIC codes (49 industries)

for a comparison between ﬁler groups using a sample of somewhat similar sized companies.
The sample includes 6,113 observations, consisting of 4,984 non-accelerated and 1,129
accelerated ﬁlers.
Table VI presents the results of the regression model estimated using both accelerated and
non-accelerated ﬁlers. The regression model includes a ﬁler status dummy variable, where
FILER equals one for non-accelerated ﬁlers and 0 for accelerated ﬁlers, and an interaction term
(FILER  EXEMPT) to tease out the ﬁler status effect on the audit fee and exemption relation.
The model is highly signiﬁcant (p < 0.01) and the adjusted R2 is 76.76 per cent. The results ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant and positive FILER  EXEMPT variable, suggesting that the increase in audit
fees from the pre- to post-exemption periods for non-accelerated ﬁlers is signiﬁcantly higher
than that of accelerated ﬁlers. The FILER variable is signiﬁcant and negative suggesting that
nonaccelerated ﬁlers have lower audit fees, on average, than those of accelerated ﬁlers. The
negative coefﬁcient on the EXEMPT variable is not signiﬁcant in the Table VI results;
however, when we expand the accelerated ﬁler sample it does indeed become signiﬁcant (see
endnote 5). These results suggest that the reported increase in audit fees for non-accelerated
ﬁlers is not simply due to a high-level trend in the audit pricing market.
The third additional analysis teases out the effect of initial audit engagements in the
regression model. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the OLS regression model using a sample of
companies that engaged the same audit ﬁrm throughout the study period (same as that used
in the ﬁrst additional analysis). We then included a dichotomous variable (INITIAL) in the

LAF ¼ a þ b 1 EXEMPT þ b 2 SIZE þ b 3 SEG þ b 4 CATA þ b 5 QUICK þ b 6 LEV
þ b 7 ROA þ b 8 GC þ b 9 BUSY þ b 10 LOSS þ b 11-59 IND
Variablea

Prediction

Estimated coefficients

t- statistic

Intercept
EXEMPT
SIZE
SEG
CATA
QUICK
LEV
ROA
GC
BUSY
LOSS
Number of observations
Adjusted R2
F-Ratio

none
þ
þ
þ
þ

þ

þ
þ
þ
1,215
86.73%
199.43***

10.836
0.052
0.447
0.013
0.028
0.004
0.002
0.001
0.156
0.153
0.177

29.25***
1.71**
51.55***
0.37
1.13
0.16
3.46***
0.78
2.41***
4.07***
4.77***
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Notes: ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively (based on one-tailed tests
where relation is predicted); aIndustry dummy variables have been suppressed for expositional convenience;
Variable deﬁnitions: LAF = natural log of audit fees in dollars, EXEMPT = 1 if post-SOX 404(b) exempt period
(2010-2012), 0 if pre-SOX 404(b) exempt period (2005-2007), SIZE = the natural log of total assets, SEG = natural
Table V.
log of the number of reported business segments, CATA = ratio of current assets to total assets, QUICK = ratio
Audit fee model
of current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities, LEV = ratio of debt to total assets, ROA = return on
using companies
assets for the year, GC = 1 if audit report is modiﬁed for going concern, 0 otherwise, BUSY = 1 if the ﬁscal year
end is December thru March, 0 otherwise, LOSS = 1 if net income is negative, 0 otherwise, IND = dummy with same auditor for
entire sample period
variables based on two-digit SIC codes (49 industries)

model that equals 1 for companies that had initial audit engagements in the pre-exempt
period, and 0 otherwise. In other words, if the company had a new auditor between 2005 and
2007, the INITIAL variable’s value for that company equals 1 for all six years in the sample
period. Our INITIAL  EXEMPT interaction term measures the post-exempt audit fees
effect for the initial audit engagement observations. The unreported results ﬁnd a positive
and signiﬁcant INITIAL variable (p < 0.01), and a negative and non-signiﬁcant INITIAL 
EXEMPT variable (p = 0.47). The positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for the INITIAL
variable is consistent with the ﬁndings of Huang et al. (2009), who ﬁnd an initial audit fee
premium in 2006. These ﬁndings also suggest that the high learning curve of initial audit
engagements generally result in higher audit fees.
However, there is no evidence that the initial audit engagements generated signiﬁcantly
greater levels of audit fee discounting from the pre- to post-exempt period as that of existing
engagements. Furthermore, the EXEMPT variable remains positive and signiﬁcant (p <
0.05) suggesting that the reported audit fee discounting result is being driven by existing
audit engagements.
The fourth additional analysis considers the potential effect of audit ﬁrm size on the
audit fee increase from the pre- to post-exemption periods for non-accelerated ﬁlers. We
estimated the regression including a BIG4 variable and a BIG4  EXEMPT interaction
term in the model. The BIG4 is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the auditor is one of the big 4
audit ﬁrms, and 0 otherwise. The interaction term (BIG4  EXEMPT) teases out the BIG4

LAF ¼ a þ b 1 EXEMPT þ b 2 FILER þ b 3 ð FILER  EXEMPT Þ þ b 4 SIZE
þ b 5 SEG þ b 6 CATA þ b 7 QUICK þ b 8 LEV þ b 9 ROA þ b 10 GC
þ b 11 BUSY þ b 12 LOSS þ b 13-61 IND
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Table VI.
Audit fee model
using both
accelerated and nonaccelerated ﬁlers

Variablea

Prediction

Estimated coefficients

t-statistic

Intercept
EXEMPT
FILER
FILER  EXEMPT
SIZE
SEG
CATA
QUICK
LEV
ROA
GC
BUSY
LOSS
Number of observations
Adjusted R2
F-Ratio

none
none

þ
þ
þ
þ

þ

þ
þ
þ
6,113
76.76%
331.96***

10.674
0.033
0.351
0.072
0.462
0.062
0.042
0.038
0.004
0.001
0.206
0.065
0.270

149.78***
0.89
11.38***
1.76**
102.33***
3.50***
5.14***
4.64***
8.46***
5.96***
8.07***
3.68***
14.85***

Notes: ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively (based on one-tailed tests
where relation is predicted); aIndustry dummy variables have been suppressed for expositional convenience;
Variable deﬁnitions: LAF = natural log of audit fees in dollars, EXEMPT = 1 if post-SOX 404(b) exempt period
(2010-2012), 0 if pre-SOX 404(b) exempt period (2005-2007), FILER = 1 if non-accelerated ﬁler (market
capitalization below US$75m), 0 if accelerated ﬁler with market capitalization between US$75m and US$150m,
SIZE = the natural log of total assets, SEG = natural log of the number of reported business segments, CATA =
ratio of current assets to total assets, QUICK = ratio of current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities,
LEV = ratio of debt to total assets, ROA = return on assets for the year, GC = 1 if audit report is modiﬁed for
going concern, 0 otherwise, BUSY = 1 if the ﬁscal year end is December thru March, 0 otherwise, LOSS = 1 if
net income is negative, 0 otherwise, IND = dummy variables based on two-digit SIC codes (49 industries)

effect on the audit fee increase from the pre- to post-exemption periods. The unreported
results ﬁnd both the BIG4 and BIG4  EXEMPT variables positive and signiﬁcant. This
suggests that non-accelerated ﬁlers with BIG4 auditors experienced a signiﬁcant increase in
audit fees from the pre- to post-exemption period above and beyond that of non-accelerated
ﬁlers with non-BIG4 auditors. The EXEMPT variable remains positive and marginally
signiﬁcant (p = 0.07). This result suggests that nonaccelerated ﬁlers with non-BIG4 auditors
experienced an increase in audit fees from the pre- to post-exemption periods.
The ﬁfth and ﬁnal additional analysis considers a more complete landscape of audit fees
post-SOX by analyzing audit fees for an extended sample period prior to our pre-exemption
period (i.e. 2002-2004). We estimated our regression model using 2002-2004 and 2002-2007 as
the pre-exemption periods. The untabulated results from these models remain qualitatively
consistent with our main results presented in Table IV.
We ﬁnd that, on average, audit fees increased 59 per cent from 2002-2004 to 2005-2007
and increased 25 per cent from 2005-2007 to 2010-2012. The signiﬁcant increase in fees from
the 2002-2004 to the 2005-2007 is not overly surprising given the tumultuous public
company auditing environment in the years immediately following SOX for both

accelerated and nonaccelerated ﬁlers. Bedard et al. (2008) identify a “spillover” effect that
caused audit fees for non-accelerated ﬁlers to increase drastically from 2003 to 2004, even
though these companies did not encounter a change in auditing regulation (i.e. SOX 404)
during this time.
The authors identify several possible reasons as to why audit fees went up for
nonaccelerated ﬁlers during this period. First, auditors may be demanding a higher level of
assurance for all ﬁnancial statement audits due to the increased scrutiny on public
companies’ ﬁnancial statements post-SOX. Second, audit ﬁrms were forced to change their
auditing methodology to comply with the integrated audit requirement of SOX; this change
in methodology likely affected non-accelerated clients as well. This “learning curve” effect
would likely increase audit fees. Third, the demise of Arthur Andersen decreased
competition in the audit market, which in turn increased audit fees. Finally, the accounting
scandals that led to this demise and to the implementation of SOX likely caused auditors to
increase their fees to decrease their litigation exposure (Bedard et al., 2008). We conclude
that these conditions were unique to the period immediately following SOX, and we do not
foresee their effects lingering during our study’s pre- and post-exemption periods.
In sum, the results of the additional analyses suggest that the reported increase in audit
fees from the pre- to post-exemption periods for non-accelerated ﬁlers is robust.
Conclusion
In this study, we examine the following research question: did auditors engage in the
practice of audit fee discounting for their non-accelerated ﬁler clients in anticipation of those
companies’ upcoming compliance with the SOX 404(b) integrated audit requirement? Prior
research provides mixed results related to audit fee discounting, speciﬁcally during the postSOX era. We theorize that auditors would be motivated to discount fees for their nonaccelerated clients for the years 2005-2007; during this period, SOX 404(b) implementation
was expected to occur imminently for non-accelerated ﬁlers. Thus, motivated by the
prospect of future economic rents (DeAngelo, 1981), auditors discounted their audit fees for
those clients.
We operationalize this research question by comparing audit fees paid by nonaccelerated ﬁlers during the pre-SOX 404(b) permanent exemption period (2005-2007) and
the post-SOX 404(b) permanent exemption period (2010-2012). We hypothesize that nonaccelerated ﬁler audit fees are lower during the pre-exemption period compared with the
post-exemption period (H1), supporting the notion of audit fee discounting.
Using an Audit Analytics sample of non-accelerated ﬁlers, our results provide evidence
that audit fees increased signiﬁcantly for non-accelerated ﬁlers post-exemption. This
evidence provides support for H1. These results are quite intuitive: auditors raised their
audit fees post-exemption due to a change in expected future economic rents.
This study provides an incremental contribution to this literature stream by ﬁrst
identifying audit fee discounting in a unique setting, allowing us to make conclusions about
the occurrence of audit fee discounting as a whole rather than through the narrower lens of
initial audit fee discounting studied in prior literature. Additionally, we ﬁnd speciﬁc support
for audit fee discounting in continuing audit engagements, while initial audit fees are higher
in our pre-exemption period, consistent with Huang et al. (2009). We also identify a potential
unintended consequence of the integrated audit requirement: impaired independence and
decreased audit quality for non-accelerated ﬁlers and a subsequent increase in audit costs to
those ﬁrms after the exemption occurred. This ﬁnding should be useful to investors,
regulators and practitioners, as they continue to consider the practice of audit fee
discounting in the post-SOX environment.
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A limitation of this study is the assumption that auditors did not anticipate the
permanent SOX 404(b) exemption for non-accelerated ﬁlers. To address this limitation, we
did an exhaustive search of the business press related to the topic of a permanent exemption
for these companies and found no mention of even the possibility of a permanent exemption
until October 2009. Thus, we are comfortable with this assumption but acknowledge that we
are unable to verify the prevailing expectation of auditors during this period.
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Notes
1. See the details of these delays in the sample section of our paper.
2. We completed a comprehensive search of 2009 business press articles using Google and LexisNexis Academic, searching for key related terms such as “SOX 404(b)”, “permanent exemption”,
“non-accelerated ﬁlers”, etc. There was no mention of the possibility of a permanent SOX 404(b)
exemption for non-accelerated ﬁlers until Congressman Garrett’s legislation was introduced to
Congress in October 2009.
3. Non-accelerated ﬁlers are companies with public ﬂoat less than US$75m. For observations with
missing price or common share data per Research Insight, we determined their ﬁler status per
Audit Analytics.
4. Granted, there are alternative explanations for this univariate increase in audit fees from the preto post-exemption period. For example, as many companies struggled through the 2008 ﬁnancial
crisis and recession, there was an increase in going concern opinions issued (Table II). This
increased the audit eﬀort needed to audit those clients, as well as the risk undertaken by auditors
to audit those clients. An increase in eﬀort and risk would increase audit fees.
5. Following Halverson and Palmquist (1980), the interpretation of a dummy variable coeﬃcient
regressed on a natural log dependent variable is determined by subtracting 1 from the antilog of
the coeﬃcient (as referenced in Gujariti, 1995, p. 526).
6. The results remain qualitatively similar as to those reported in Table VI when we use a size
cutoﬀ of US$300m for accelerated ﬁlers, and when we include all accelerated ﬁlers. The exception
is the variable EXEMPT becomes signiﬁcant (negative) in these models.

References
Aguilar, M. (2009a), “404(b) for Small Cos. Delayed to FYEs Until June 15, 2010”, available at: www.
complianceweek.com/404b-for-small-cos-delayed-to-fyes-until-june-152010/article/187264 (accessed
27 May 2014).
Aguilar, M. (2009b), “Financial Regulation Moves Ahead, With SOX Exemption”, available at: www.
complianceweek.com/ﬁnancial-regulation-moves-ahead-with-soxexemption/article/187303/ (accessed
27 May 2014).
American Institute of Certiﬁed Public Accountants (AICPA) (1978), Commission on Auditors’
Responsibilities: Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations, AICPA, New York, NY.
Bedard, J., Hoitash, U. and Hoitash, R. (2008), “Audit pricing and internal control disclosures among
non-accelerated ﬁlers”, Research in Accounting Regulation, Vol. 20, pp. 103-126.
Craswell, A., Francis, J. and Taylor, S. (1995), “Auditor brand name reputations and industry
specializations”, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 20 No. 3, pp. 297-322.
Craswell, A. and Francis, J. (1999), “Pricing initial audit engagements: a test of competing theories”, The
Accounting Review, Vol. 74 No. 2, pp. 201-216.
DeAngelo, L.E. (1981), “Audit independence, ‘low balling’, and disclosure regulation”, Journal of
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 113-127.

Desir, R., Casterella, J. and Kokina, J. (2014), “A reexamination of audit fees for initial audit engagements in
the post-SOX period”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 33 No. 2, pp. 59-78.
Ettredge, M. and Greenberg, R. (1990), “Determinants of fee cutting on initial audit engagements”,
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 28 No. 1, pp. 198-210.
Ettredge, M., Fuerherm, E. and Li, C. (2014), “Fee pressure and audit quality”, Accounting,
Organizations, and Society, Vol. 39 No. 4, pp. 247-263.
Ferguson, A., Francis, J. and Stokes, D. (2003), “The effects of ﬁrm-wide and ofﬁce-level industry
expertise on audit pricing”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 78 No. 2, pp. 429-448.
Francis, J., Reichelt, K. and Wang, D. (2005), “The pricing of national and city-speciﬁc reputations
for industry expertise in the US audit market”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 80 No. 1,
pp. 133-136.
Frankel, R., Johnson, M. and Nelson, K. (2002), “The relation between auditors’ fees for nonaudit
services and earnings management”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 77 No. s1, pp. 71-105.
Ghosh, A. and Lustgarten, S. (2006), “Pricing of initial audit engagements by large and small audit
ﬁrms”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 23 No. 2, pp. 333-368.
Ghosh, A. and Pawlewicz, R. (2009), “The impact of regulation on auditor fees: evidence from the
sarbanes-oxley act”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 28 No. 2, pp. 171-197.
Gujariti, D.N. (1995), Basic Econometrics, 3rd edn., McGraw-Hill, New York, NY.
H.R. 3775. (2009), “111th congress: small business SOX compliance relief act”, available at: www.
govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr3775 (accessed 15 August 2014).
H.R. 4173. (2010), “111th congress: Dodd-frank wall street reform and consumer protection act”,
available at: www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4173 (accessed 21 August 2014).
Halverson, R. and Palmquist, R. (1980), “The interpretation of dummy variables in semilogarithmic
equations”, American Economic Review, Vol. 70 No. 3, pp. 474-475.
Hansen, G. (2010), “Audit fees and engagement proﬁtability: a threats and safeguards approach to
strengthen compliance with standards of ethical behaviour”, available at: http://nasba.org/ﬁles/
2011/03/Ethics_and_Strategic_Issues_Discussion-22Oct20.pdf (accessed 18 January 2016).
Huang, H., Raghunandan, K. and Rama, D. (2009), “Audit fees for initial audit engagements before and
after SOX”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 28 No. 1, pp. 171-190.
Kanodia, C. and Mukherji, A. (1994), “Audit pricing, lowballing and auditor turnover: a dynamic
analysis”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 69 No. 4, pp. 593-615.
Krishnan, J., Rama, D. and Zhang, Y. (2008), “Costs to comply with SOX section 404”, Auditing: A
Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 27 No. 1, pp. 169-186.
Krishnan, G. and Zhang, Y. (2014), “Is there a relation between audit fee cuts during the global ﬁnancial
crisis and banks’ ﬁnancial reporting quality?”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 33
No. 3, pp. 279-300.
Nagy, A.L. (2014), “Audit partner specialization and audit fees”, Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 29
No. 6, pp. 513-526.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (2004), Auditing Standard No. 2: An Audit of
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction With and Audit of Financial
Statements, PCAOB, Washington, DC, available at: https://pcaobus.org//Standards/Auditing/
Pages/Auditing_Standard_2.aspx (accessed 6 June 2017).
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (2011), “Concept Release on Auditor
Independence and Audit Firm Rotation”, Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 37: Release No. 2011006, available at: http://pcaobus.org/rules/rulemaking/docket037/release_2011-006.pdf (accessed
18 January 2016).
Raghunandan, K. and Rama, D.V. (2006), “SOX section 404 material weakness disclosures and audit
fees”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 25 No. 1, pp. 99-114.

729

730

Sankaraguruswamy, S. and Whisenant, S. (2009), “Pricing Initial Audit Engagements: Empirical
Evidence Following Public Disclosure of of Audit Fees”, Working paper, National University of
Singapore and University of Kansas, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=452680
Sankaraguruswamy, S., Whisenant, S. and Willenborg, M. (2012), “Pricing and quality of initial audit
engagements”, Working paper, National University of Singapore, University of Houston, and
University of Connecticut.
Simon, D.T. and Francis, J.R. (1988), “The effect of auditor change on audit fees: Tests of price cutting
and price recovery”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 63 No. 2, pp. 255-269.
Simunic, D. (1980), “The pricing of audit services: Theory and evidence”, Journal of Accounting
Research, Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 161-190.
Stanley, J. and DeZoort, F. (2007), “Audit ﬁrm tenure and ﬁnancial restatements: an analysis of industry
specialization and fee effects”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 131-159.
Walker, P. and Casterella, J. (2000), “The role of auditee proﬁtability in pricing new audit engagements”,
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 157-167.
Corresponding author
Benjamin W. Hoﬀman can be contacted at: bhoﬀm11@kent.edu

